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The Evolution of
Drug Legislation in Kentucky
By DALE H. FARBmEE, M.D.*
The Kentucky Penal Code chapter' directed at the establish-
ment of uniform penalties for standardized drug abuse offenses
was a serious effort to achieve a rational basis from which to view
the area of drug abuse control. Its failure to be enacted into law
must be charged to the intensity of feelings that surround this
entire area of concern in contemporary society.
A primary antecedent of the present furor is the centuries
old medico-socio-theological-legal debate about use, abuse and/or
control of alcohol. From a generic standpoint, one must look at
the "drug" controversy as developing along the exact same lines-
for alcohol is indeed a drug. All we have done is shift the con-
troversy from alcohol to other drugs.
As long as man has a body and consciousness, he will be
exposed to the possibilities of alterations in that body and con-
sciousness through external substances and circumstances. What
substances he will use, whether and how he will use them, and
for what purposes, are critical questions which each individual
must answer, both to himself and in the context of society.
Individuals are influenced in these decisions by their concept of
personal needs and satisfactions and by their relative desire to
accommodate these satisfactions to the demands of their social
environment. Society, in turn, often argues that acceptance of
the individuals' rights hinges upon subjugation of his desires to
the norms or standards of the established society. The degree of
separation of these conflicting positions is an index of the degree
of social turmoil.
In the case of drugs, many viewpoints of various institutions
of society were in such a state of conflict with those of significant
* A.B. 1951, Indiana University; M.D. 1958, University of Louisville. Com-
missioner of Mental Health, Commonwealth of Kentucky.
I ENTUcKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARcH COMMISSION, KENTUCKY PENAL CODE
§§ 2900-2915 (Final Draft 1971) [hereinafter cited as LRC].
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numbers of individuals as to have made a standard solution unac-
ceptable at the time. Thus, the portions of the Penal Code ad-
dressed to those areas of social disagreement in which the norms
of society and the desires of individuals were not sufficiently re-
solved as to permit unanimity were not acceptable as proposed.
The Legislature, reflecting the mood of these unresolved public
attitudes enacted the Penal Code without the controversial sec-
tions. It is my intent in this paper to provide some history of the
conflict and to describe how the final compromise was reached
and how it differs from the rejected chapter.
From the medical viewpoint, use of narcotic drugs has been
one of the significant therapeutic advances in the relief of human
suffering. As analgesics, morphine and other opium alkaloids
have been mainstays of surgical and medical practice since 1803.2
Massive use of such drugs in the United States began during
the Civil War,3 and, where available, saved many lives through
alleviation of pain and subsequent shock during and following
amputation and internal exploration. But the years thereafter
through the turn of the century brought evidence of a more
unhappy state of affairs. Not only did the iatrogenic incidence of
addiction grow, but hundreds of other cases occurred through the
easy availability of narcotics to the general public.
While medical circles have disagreed for years as to the prob-
ability of narcotics addiction in passive-dependent personality
types as compared to more stable personalities, there is a solid
consensus that physical addiction is a frequent result of long
continued use of opiates. Consequently, the trend of legislation
has been toward protection of the public through denial of free
access to drugs and through control of actions of practitioners and
pharmacists. By 1914, this viewpoint was sufficiently popular to
bring about major federal legislative action, the Harrison Act.4
This law used a tax approach for registration and control. One
finds little evidence of a punitive outlook at that time; rather,
the primary concern was for prevention of the social destructive-
2 Hanzlik, 125th Anniversary of the Discovery of Morphine by Serturner, 18
J. Am. PHArm. Ass'N 375-84 (1929).
3 Machit, The History of Opium and Some of its Preparations and Alkaloids,
64 J.A.M.A. 477-81 (1915).
4 Harrison Act, 38 Stat. 785 (1914); see also Federal Import and Export Act,
35 Stat. 614 (1909), 21 U.S.C. § 171.
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ness inflicted upon the individual as a consequence of addiction.
In Kentucky, a statute limiting prescription and dispensing of
cocaine by physicians, pharmacists and dentists had been passed
as early as 1902.' In 1908, penalties were stiffened 6 and by 1912,
Kentucky bad prohibited sales of opium and its salts except on
original prescription.'
A decade after passage of the Harrison Act, Kentucky further
revised its drug control laws,8 the revision again aimed primarily
at regulating professional activities with opiates. This 1924 statute,
for the first time, provided imprisonment as a penalty for illegal
sales of opiates, and imposed differential penalties for other than
the first offense.
Further evidence of advanced thinking by Kentucky law-
makers is presented in a 1928 statute, which provided for care
and treatment of persons addicted to narcotic drugs.9 This law
allowed the Kentucky state hospitals, then operated by the De-
partment of Welfare, to admit such persons under "lunacy"
commitment. Voluntary patients were required to agree to a
minimum six months' hospitalization. Pioneer efforts were later
incorporated in principle into statutes such as the Federal Nar-
cotics Addict Rehabilitation Act of 19661 and present state laws"
with respect to utlization of treatment agencies in lieu of penal
institutions.
The twenty years following enactment of the Harrison Act
were relatively quiet in terms of major federal drug legislation.
A notable exception was the passage in 1929 of authority to con-
struct and operate the Public Health Service addiction treatment
hospitals at Fort Worth, Texas, and Lexington, Kentucky.1
2
However, with the end of the Volstead Act, drugs again became
a matter of national legislative attention. Led by a former
alcohol prohibition agent named Harry J. Anslinger, then head
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics established by the Harrison
G Ky. AcTS ch. 85 (1902).
IKy. AcTs ch. 29, at 80 (1908).
7Ky. AcTs ch. 86, § 1 (1912).8 Ky. Acts ch. 104 (1924).
9 Ky. AcTs ch. 16, §§ 64, 65, 66, 67 (1928).
3028 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. (1970).
IIKy. REv. STAT. § 218A.990(6)(a), (7)(a) (1972) [hereinafter cited as
KRSI; see also KRS §§ 222.420 and 222.430.
12 45 Stat. 1085 (1929).
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Act, a militant anti-marijuana group succeeded in convincing
the Congress of the need for a marijuana tax law."3 The Act,
passed in 1937, placed cannabis in the status of a narcotic (al-
though the American Medical Association testified to the con-
trary).
While the crusade against cannabis was being developed by
the activities of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, several state
legislatures passed the "Uniform Narcotic Drug Act." The prin-
cipal effect of this statute was to establish a degree of national
uniformity in definition of narcotic drugs and approaches to their
control. Kentucky enacted this legislation in 1934.14
The Kentucky Legislature controlled illegal possession and
sale of cannabis that same year with a separate law. For a first
offense, the penalty was thirty days to one year in jail and/or a
$100-$500 fine. A subsequent offense drew one to five years'
imprisonment. 5
Following Mr. Anslinger's 1937 success at defining cannabis
as a narcotic, the states were urged to follow the federal law, and
Kentucky did so in 1944,16 thus increasing the penalty for illegal
possession of cannabis to a felony on first offense. From this point
through 1950, relatively little activity occurred in the Kentucky
General Assembly with respect to drug controls, but a significant
alteration of legislative attitude toward the narcotic user was
demonstrated in the passage of a 1946 statute which provided im-
prisonment as an alternative to treatment.
17
In 1950, additional regulation was imposed upon pharmacists
and practitioners regarding prescription, possession, dispensing
and administration of barbiturates."8 These statutes reflected the
concern of physicians and pharmacists alike that the incidence of
"sleeping pill" suicides and other abuses were too frequent and
that tighter controls were needed on supplies. Also, there had
13 Federal Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, 26 U.S.C. § 4741. See Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), holding unconstitutional that part of § 176(a) of the
Act relating to presumption of defendant's knowledge of illegal importation.
34 Ky. Ac'rs ch. ]43 (1934).
15 Ky. Acrs ch. J42 (1934).
36 Ky. Acs ch. 136 (1944).
17 Ky. ACTS ch. 167 (1946), (codified as KRS § 218.250), repealed Ky. AcTs
ch. 106 § 2 (1966) after Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), but a
similar provision was enacted in the 1966 legislative session, Ky. AcTs ch. 106, § 1
(KRS § 218.210(4)).
18Ky. AcTs ch. 65, §§ 1-10 (1950).
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been dramatic progress in the synthesis of drugs since the end
of World War II, and the number of compounds available was
multiplying at a fantastic rate. After 1950, virtually nothing was
changed until 1958, when further barbiturate controls were en-
acted. In Kentucky, continued concern with barbiturate abusers
was manifested by stiffening of penalties for forgery of prescrip-
tions and similar efforts to obtain drugs by false representation."9
In the decades of the 1940's and 1950's, organized crime was
alleged to have actively exacerbated drug addiction through the
massive smuggling of heroin-an opiate with two and one-half
times the potency of morphine or demerol.20 During this period,
the federal government, with assistance from police of the larger
states, conducted a financially limited effort to curtail illegal
importation of opiates. These law enforcement efforts, plus the
Fort Worth and Lexington hospital facilities, constituted the
major portion of the federal effort dealing with the addiction
problem.
The Addiction Research Center functioned at the Lexington
Public Health Service site and served as the principal, albeit
limited, federal research service until passage of the 1970 Federal
Comprehensive Controlled Dangerous Substances Act. But re-
search in the field, primarily because of lack of concern, was
virtually non-existent. Preconceptions as to the nature of the
problem were therefore unchallenged. Public information about
drug addiction was substantially restricted to dramas and other
unreliable information, and news stories generally featured the
criminal aspect.
Several tragic hypotheses may be stated as characteristic of
the thinking of the period:
1. Drug addiction is a socio-legal problem, restricted for the
most part to certain ethnic and racial groups living in
metropolitian ghettos.
2. Drug addiction rehabilitation is useless. (There was a
recidivism rate of 95%, but few studies considered the
return of the addict from treatment to the same personal-
social precipitants without follow-up or supportive ac-
tivity.)
19 Ky. ACmS ch. 98, §§ 1-13 (1958).2 0 L. GOODMAN & A. GiumAN, THE PHARMACOLOciCAL BAsis OF THER"'Buncs
284 (4th ed. 1970).
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3. Drug addiction is caused by organized crime seeking to
realize high profits from human suffering.
4. Drug addiction can be resolved as a struggle between
police and criminals ("junkies" or "pushers"). (This last
hypothesis was enhanced by the antisocial acts of addicts
in obtaining funds or drugs to support their habits.)
5. Drug addiction is characterized by violent behavior- ad-
dicts are "dope fiends" and must be "put away."
These popularly accepted notions tended to focus concepts
of drug abuse and addiction into a package labeled "dope." Such
stereotyped and superficial concepts left the public, medicine,
law, and theology almost helpless in the face of the explosive
intellectualization of drug use that burst upon us in the '60's
with the "discovery" of LSD and the accelerated use of amphet-
amines, marijuana and other hallucinogens.
The opening of the famed Kefauver Hearings on December 7,
1959, heralded the advent of the '60's as a decade of turmoil and
strife about drugs, both as medicinal and recreational agents.
Amphetamines were increasingly in the public view because
of the alleged abuse of benzedrine and methamphetamine by
students and truck drivers for extending waking hours and as
stimulants, and by others for appetite suppression by prescription.
Drug manufacturers, physicians and pharmacists all received some
degree of censure as Senator Kefauver's committee delved into
alleged price fixing, limitless sample distribution, and connections
of organized crime to illegal drug traffic. The hearings received
great public attention and resulted in the 1962 passage of Public
Law 87-781 which amended the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act to strengthen methods of identification and inspection of
drugs.
The alienation of many young people with war and social
distress was manifested by their "dropping out" into the drug
culture-a practice neither understood nor well tolerated by the
social standards of the 1950's. Evidence of fantastically rapid
escalation of use of cannabis, LSD and other hallucinogens for
psychedelic adventures accumulated, and was widely dissem-
inated in popular publications, legitimate and otherwise.
In Kentucky, the General Assembly approved new statutes in
1960 which prohibited sale, manufacture, possession, dispen-
Vol. 61
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sing, prescription, or administration of amphetamines other than
through authorized (licensed) channels.2 These laws notably
placed few requirements upon manufacturers as to quantity or
quality of drugs produced, although a clear definition of amphet-
amines was established. The light penalties for violations were
amended in 1964 to bring them into line (two to five years and/or
$1,000-$5,000 fine) with those of barbituate offenses.2"
The situation remained static until 1968, when the Kentucky
Department of Health successfully sought to have enacted "The
Kentucky Dangerous Drug Act of 1968."23 This Act drew little
attention, or opposition, as it was enacted. Introduced as de-
partmental legislation, the primary purpose was consolidation
of the existing regulations on amphetamines and barbiturates,
and extension of controls to cover several hallucinogenic agents,
including Peyote, Mescaline and LSD. Marijuana had been
placed in the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in 1944 and it was
apparently felt that the two laws, one dealing with "dangerous"
drugs and the other dealing with narcotics, would cover the
situation adequately.
The new law set relatively severe penalties for possession of
hallucinogens, 24 and a multitude of confrontational situations
arose immediately. On college campuses and in totally unex-
pected areas, such as high schools, incidents of arrest and prosecu-
tion produced the cultural shock of a generation. Instead of
apprehending the usual "junkies," so popularly thought of as drug
abusers, police, Health Department and Board of Pharmacy
officers (given police powers by Kentucky Revised Statutes §
217.790 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS]) frequently found them-
selves arresting children of middle and upper socio-economic
class families, as well as many erudite and highly intelligent
persons.25
Throughout the nation, the shock waves reverberated and
the debates of the '30's rose anew. Drug abuse no longer could
21 Ky. Acts ch. 246, §§ 1-9 (1960).
22 Ky. Acrs ch. 190, §§ 1-3 (1964).
23 Ky. Acrs cli. 81, §§ 1-16 (1968).
24 KRS § 217.995(2) made possession of LSD, Mescaline, Peyote, Psilocybin,
Psilocin, DMT and STP punishable by 2-5 years imprisonment and $1000-$5000
fine.
25 See Hill, Marijuana: Many Believe the Penalty for its Use is too Stiff, Ken-
tucky Kernel, January 23, 1970.
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be stereotyped as an "occupational hazard" of medical people,
or the habit of the "social outcast," or the mark of the confirmed
criminal. The collision of the heavy penalties for possession and
the wide spectrum of society involved produced immediate de-
mands for reassessment of the situation.
By 1970, the federal government was proposing a complete
revision of all statutes pertaining to narcotics and dangerous
drugs. These federal statutes, basically contained within Titles
21 and 42 of the United States Code, with some references under
Title 18, were the cumulative results of some sixty years of effort
to cope with the problem. The consensus in the United States
Congress was that revisions were needed, but for almost a year
the hearings held by both the House and Senate Committees
sharply indicated the extent of divergence of viewpoint 26 In
fact, the two houses enacted separate and differing bills, and the
House refused to act on the bill passed by the Senate, preferring
instead to propose its own version. Finally, in October 1970, a
compromise bill was accepted by both houses and was approved
by the President on October 27.27
The final version of the law (which in many aspects served
as a model for the 1972 KRS Chapter 218A) covers four general
areas of concern. Title I is addressed to rehabilitation of drug
abusers. It effected changes in the Community Mental Health
Centers Act2s and the Public Health Service Act2 9 which ulti-
mately unifies the approach of federal grant and federally
operated programs in the field of drug abuse treatment, education
and research.
Title II, cited as the "Controlled Dangerous Substances Act,"
defined terms such as "addict," "controlled substance," and "dis-
pense" (categories of abuse and/or therapeutic potential; distilled
spirits are specifically excluded). This title sets up the schedules
26 The extent of divergence in viewpoints is exemplified by the multiplicity of
bills introduced in the 91st Congress; to note just a few-Controlled Dangerous
Substance Act, S. 2637, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Dirksen); Comprehensive Narcotic
Addiction and Drug Abuse Care and Control Act of 1969, S. 2608, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (Yarborough); Drug Abuse Control Act of 1969, S. 2592, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (Montoya); Omnibus Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Control and Addict
Rehabilitation Act of 1969, S. 1895, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Dodd).
27 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 2688k, 26881, 2688m (Supp. 1972).
2942 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (Supp. 1972).
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to which various controlled substances will be assigned and de-
fines the authority by which they will be included or deleted. It
also details the requirements and procedures for registration,
establishes production quota authority over manufacturers, and
defines offenses and penalties for violation. The penalties for
simple possession are similar to those set in the 1970 amendments
to the Kentucky Dangerous Drug Act, except that first offenders
in the area of narcotic drugs are also held to a maximum sentence
of one year, probatable, and expungable. (A chart demonstrating
the penalties provided in KRS chapter 218A is appended.)
The 1970 amendments to the Kentucky Dangerous Drug Act
became effective in June of 1970, and the Federal Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 became effective
in May 1971.
Title III concerns importation and exportation and sets of-
fenses and penalties for individuals and/or other manufacturers
of controlled substances who illegally import such substances into
the United States. Title IV is a relatively unimportant section
relating to advisory councils of the Secretary of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare.
Among the many important rearrangements dictated by this
omnibus act was the appointment of a National Study Commission
on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, and the transfer of all administra-
tive and enforcement provisions to the jurisdiction of the Attorney
General. The latter was one of the more bitterly discussed sec-
tions. The Federal Food and Drug Administration and other
agencies who had long held some degree of responsibility for
the medical approach to drug abuse were placed in a position of
tacit admission that they bad not used their enforcement powers
adequately. This new awareness of the need for both a re-
habilitation and enforcement approach was again emulated in
the proposed Chapter 29 and the enacted Chapter 218A of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
(The penalties for various violations of chapter 218A are
demonstrated in the chart appended to the paper. A comparison
is provided with penalties as they would be established under the
Penal Code. Schedule I drugs have high abuse potential and no
accepted medical use. Schedules II, III and IV categorize drugs
that still have some abuse potential but are frequently prescribed.)
1973]
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The stage was set for the next act.
As Justice Palmore has noted in his preface, the Kentucky
Penal Code revision staff drafted a new drug control law during
the 1969-71 period. Shortly after passage of Public Law 91-513
(1970), the Kentucky Department of Health began working on a
revision of the Kentucky Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and other
existing statutes affecting the functions of the Kentucky Board
of Health. The Department of Mental Health became involved
with both groups as a result of its role in drug treatment and
rehabilitation programs.
After several meetings between staff members of the Depart-
ment of Mental Health, Department of Health and the Penal
Code Revision Review Committee, a bill draft was produced,
differing from the proposed Penal Code Chapter only in the
continuance of mandatory sentencing of first offenders to the
Department of Mental Health (for possession only). The draft
specified permissive wording for this offense.
Under the draft proposal, jurisdiction over possession of dan-
gerous drug cases was extended to county and police courts, as well
as circuit courts, and the various aspects of licensing and regulation
of pharmacists and physicians were worked out. Most impor-
tantly, the proposed law was in agreement with the new com-
prehensive federal law regarding assignment of abuse potential
drugs to the various schedules. Interviews with police and de-
partment officials in metropolitan and rural areas were held and
several adjustments in the statute to cover such controversial
areas as confiscation and use of unidentified informants were
made, although not without extended debate.
In short, the approach taken in the proposed statute was
much the same as that taken by the federal revision with re-
habilitation, enforcement, penalties and administration compre-
hensively covered. The primary difference had been the absence
of public hearings during the drafting phase. This was to be left
to the General Assembly.
The joint draft, Senate Bill 274, now KRS Chapter 218A, was
introduced as departmental legislation from the Department of
Health in the belief that it would function as the primary drug
control bill during any interim period that might occur prior to
an effective date for Chapter 29. However, the public hearings
[Vol. 61
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that were held by the joint Senate-House Judiciary Subcommittee
quickly revealed bow divergent were the opinions of various
public groups. As was the case with the federal statute, experts
from medical, legal and legislative fields differed widely in their
opinions. Chapter 29 was amended out of the Penal Code Bill
and Senate Bill 274 was left as the vehicle carrying the brunt
of the debate.
During the committee hearings on this bill, various amend-
ments were offered and accepted, perhaps the most notable of
which differentiated the treatment of possession and transfer
offenses involving cannabis. As may be seen in the appendix
charts, a significantly different approach was taken with respect
to the degree of penalty assigned to these offenses as opposed to
those assigned to other hallucinogens.
In the final bill enacted by the General Assembly, mandatory
sentencing of first offenders to the Department of Mental Health
for possession of cannabis was changed to provide more discretion
to the court. The new law provides for a fine, a jail sentence of not
more than 90 days or sentencing to the Department of Mental
Health for possession or transfer of marijuana, regardless of the
number of offenses.
With respect to other dangerous drugs, the General Assembly
continued the mandatory provisions for educational and rehabil-
itation opportunities on first offense. This approach is supported
by some as yet unpublished reports of the Kentucky Department
of Mental Health. During the 1970-72 period, a trial group of
three persons sentenced to prison on first offense under the 1968
law were paroled to the Department of Mental Health. This
group, having been exposed to the prison drug culture for over
a year each before being paroled, without exception, were re-
turned to prison for violation of parole within six months of
release. On the other hand, in an 18-month period of 1970-72,
only eighteen of 875 offenders sentenced were rearrested. These
figures can only suggest that further efforts at prevention and
early rehabilitation are warranted.
Whatever viewpoint the reader may espouse regarding drug
abuse, there is the certain knowledge that others are in disagree-
ment. From that standpoint, although the enactment of Senate
Bill 274 as Chapter 218A could be said to have completely satisfied
1973]
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no one, it was successful in that almost everyone was willing to
accept it as a fair and comprehensive approach to a problem
that is as complex and unsettled as any in our society.
Since schedules for abuse drugs are in accord with Public
Law 91-513, there is now unanimity between federal and state
enforcement statutes as to what constitutes a felony and what
constitutes a misdemeanor. Schedules I and II differ in that
allocation of a drug to Schedule I allows its legitimate use only
for research, whether it be narcotic or otherwise. Examples are
heroin (narcotic) and cannabis (non-narcotic). Schedule II drugs
have legitimate medical utilization but still have great abuse and
dependency potential. Examples are morphine (narcotic) and
amphetamines (non-narcotic). Schedule III drugs are also med-
ically valuable and have even less abuse and dependency po-
tential. These generally include hypnotics and cough syrup.
Finally, drugs categorized in Schedules IV and V have the least
dependency and abuse potential, but still are sensitive enough
to require control. The drugs may be narcotic, but are in com-
pound state. These schedules are adjusted at the state level by
the Kentucky Board of Health, and for federal purposes, by the
Attorney General, with the advice and consent of the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare.
SUMMARY
The period from 1960-72 dramatically illustrated the turmoil
that resulted from "too little, too late." The aftermath of the
Kefauver hearings, the tragedy of thalidomide, the popularity
of Timothy Leary's writings on LSD, and the apathy of the Food
and Drug Administration, combined with the general disinterest
of the medical profession and the avarice of some drug manu-
facturers, all helped to propel the "drug scene" into the popular
press, with virtually no competent public leadership and knowl-
edge with which to place it in perspective. The public was
understandably upset, and the resultant nation wide anxiety
produced cries for answers-immediate ones.
Here one can easily observe the application of the old axiom
that "nature abhors a vacuum." As blow after blow fell in the
public arena, experts appeared as if by magic. Most of them
vanished as quickly as they had appeared, but one fact remains
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indisputable. A contemporary generation, perhaps better edu-
cated and more inclined to analyze, and certainly more willing
to intellectualize the situation, is emerging. Despite the stereo-
types of the '80's-'50's, and the impressions locked in the culture
of our middle and older generations, there are major socio-
cultural changes evolving in our efforts to control all alien sub-
stances. This is the most hopeful sign in an otherwise funereal
situation.
What one can hope for in the future, as hysteria assumes a
less commanding role, is the straightforward adoption by of-
ficials and the public alike of a rational and intensive applica-
tion of our skills to the problem.
Public safety must of course be maintained. It is as unrealistic
to cry out for "instant change" as it is to demand "maintain the
status quo." Such simplistic answers are not beneficial to the
solution of complex problems. Prohibiting drinkers from driving
has not resulted in removal of all drinking drivers from the road,
and if it did, one would still have drinkers. The problem has only
shifted. If we are to attain an intelligent, fair and lasting solution
to our still existing problems in drug abuse control, we must
approach it from all directions at once with full intent to solve it
cooperatively.
To that end, I am sure that almost no one will be totally sat-
isfied with Chapter 218A. But it is progressive legislation,
responsive to the contemporary as well as the traditional values
of our society. Until there is more time for our culture to reach
a consensus about drug use, and to bridge the gaps of these past
forty years, I believe it to be conceptually more satisfactory to
more people than any drug law we have had in many years.
1973]
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